Sentencing Indigenous Offenders by Anthony, T
INDIGENOUS JUSTICE CLEARINGHOUSE
A series of Research Briefs designed to bring research findings to policy makers
Sentencing Indigenous offenders
 Brief 7, March 2010
 
Thalia Anthony
Written for the Indigenous Justice Clearinghouse
Introduction
When sentencing Indigenous 
offenders, courts in Australia and 
New Zealand do their work in the 
knowledge that the rates of Indigenous 
imprisonment are much higher than 
the rates for the community as a 
whole. This brief seeks to provide an 
evidence base for the development of 
law and policy by highlighting some 
key issues concerning the sentencing 
of Indigenous offenders. It first outlines 
the statutory frameworks that are in 
place in Australia and New Zealand. 
Second, it discusses the development 
of common law principles relating 
to the sentencing of Indigenous 
offenders, focusing on the relevance 
of Indigenous status and Indigenous 
laws (often called customary law) and 
cultural practices. Finally, it reports 
on the results of statistical studies of 
sentencing of Indigenous offenders. 
While the brief only examines the 
sentencing stage of the criminal 
justice process, it is important to note 
that this stage is the culmination of 
a number of earlier procedures and 
decisions. Decisions are made by 
legislators about the criminalisation 
of certain behaviours, maximum 
penalties and whether sentencing 
is to be discretionary, subject to 
guidelines, or mandatory. Decisions 
are made about the deployment of 
police in certain places, and about the 
exercise of police discretion to impose 
on the spot fines, to charge or not 
charge, to divert or issue a warning. 
Prosecutors must also make choices 
about whether to proceed. Judicial 
officers make decisions about bail, 
the admissibility of evidence and, in 
the lower courts, guilt or innocence. 
Certain sentencing options, such as 
home detention, periodic detention, 
and community service, are available 
in some geographic locations but 
not others (see RCIADIC 1991, 
Snowball 2008). All of these decisions 
affect the position of a person who 
is to be sentenced. It is beyond the 
scope of this brief to discuss how 
the Indigenous offender might be 
particularly affected by the exercise of 
these many discretions. Discussion of 
some of these can be found in Edney 
and Bagaric (2007).  The brief is 
specifically focused on the sentencing 
variables of Indigenous status, cultural 
practice and Indigenous laws.
The statutory framework
Sentencing in Australia and New 
Zealand operates within statutory 
frameworks: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), 
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 
1999 (NSW), Sentencing Act 1995 
(NT), Penalties and Sentences Act 
1992 (Qld), Criminal Law (Sentencing 
Act) 1988 (SA), Sentencing Act 
1997 (Tas), Sentencing Act 1991 
(Vic), Sentencing Act 1994 (WA), 
Sentencing Act 2002 (NZ). The 
purposes of sentencing include 
deterrence, the protection of the 
community, the rehabilitation of 
the offender, accountability for the 
offender, denunciation, and recognition 
of the harm done to the victim and the 
community: Cth s16A, ACT s7, NSW 
s3A, NT s5(1), Qld s9(1), SA s10, Tas 
s3, Vic s5, NZ s7.
Sentencing statutes set out some of 
the matters that must be taken into 
account by judicial officers in the 
sentencing process. The statutes 
vary, but most include the maximum 
penalty for the offence, the nature 
of and harm caused by the offence, 
the identity and age of the victim, the 
offender’s criminal record, character, 
age, intellectual capacity, prospects 
of rehabilitation, and remorse (Cth 
s16A, ACT s33, NSW s21A, NT s6A, 
Qld s9(2), SA s10, Tas s9, WA ss7, 
8, NZ ss8, 9). Courts have discretion 
to take into account a wide range of 
aggravating and mitigating factors 
relevant to the offender and the 
offence. These increase or reduce a 
sentence respectively. 
In three Australian jurisdictions and 
New Zealand, legislation refers 
specifically to the offender’s cultural 
background. The ACT legislation 
specifies that the court must consider 
whether the cultural background of the 
offender is relevant (s33(m)). Courts 
in Queensland, when sentencing an 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 
person, must have regard to 
submissions made by a representative 
www.indigenousjustice.gov.au
2I n d i g e n o u s  J u s t i c e  C l e a r i n g h o u s e
of the community justice group in the 
offender’s community, including ‘any 
cultural considerations’ (s9(2)(p)). In 
the Northern Territory, a sentencing 
court may receive information about 
an aspect of Indigenous customary 
law, or the views of members of an 
Indigenous community, but only where 
certain procedural requirements 
have been fulfilled (s104A). In New 
Zealand, the court ‘must take into 
account the offender’s personal, 
family, whanau [Māori  extended 
family], community, and cultural 
background in imposing a sentence’ 
(s8(i) and s27). More recently, in 2006 
and 2007 the Australian Government 
passed the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
s16A(2A) and the Northern Territory 
National Emergency Response Act 
2007 (‘NTNERA’) (Cth) s91, which 
limit the use of ‘customary law or 
cultural practice’ in sentencing and bail 
considerations. 
Law reform commissions have 
pointed to the need for sentencing 
principles to accommodate the 
unique circumstances of Indigenous 
offenders. The Australian Law Reform 
Commission (1986: [517]) and the 
Law Reform Commission of Western 
Australia (2006: 183) recommended 
that the cultural background of 
the offender should be included 
as a relevant sentencing factor in 
legislation. This recommendation 
has not been acted upon in Western 
Australia and has been rejected at a 
Commonwealth level. In New South 
Wales, the Law Reform Commission 
concluded that it was unnecessary for 
legislation to refer specifically to the 
sentencing of Indigenous offenders 
because it is covered by the common 
law (New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission 2000: [2.47], [3.88]). 
Courts are required to give ‘careful 
attention’ to maximum penalties 
(Markarian v R 2005: [31]). Where 
maximum penalties have increased, 
courts are expected to give effect 
to the legislature’s intention that 
penalties should increase (R v Way 
2004: [52]). For example, penalties in 
New South Wales have increased in 
recent times (Indyk & Donnelly 2007), 
and it is likely that these increases 
have contributed to the increased 
imprisonment rates of Indigenous 
people.
Mandatory penalties are part of the 
statutory framework in the Northern 
Territory and Western Australia. In 
Western Australia, a person convicted 
of home burglary who is a repeat 
offender must be sentenced to at least 
12 months imprisonment and that 
sentence must not be suspended (WA 
s401(4)). In the Northern Territory, 
offenders convicted of aggravated 
property offences, certain violent 
offences and sexual offences must 
be sentenced to imprisonment (NT 
ss78B-BB). 
Nevertheless, there is a common 
law principle that imprisonment is 
a sanction of last resort (Parker 
v DPP 1992). This principle has 
been enacted in legislation in the 
Commonwealth (s17A), NSW (s5(1), 
Qld (s9(2)(a)), SA (s 11), Vic (s5(4)), 
WA (s6(4)) and NZ (s8(g)).   
Sentencing principles 
and Indigenous offenders
Justice Brennan of the High Court of 
Australia stated in Neal v R (1982: 
326) that: 
The same sentencing principles 
are to be applied, of course, in 
every case, irrespective of the 
identity of a particular offender 
or his membership of an ethnic 
or other group. But in imposing 
sentences courts are bound to take 
into account, … , all material facts 
including those facts which exist 
only by reason of the offender’s 
membership of an ethnic or other 
group. So much is essential to the 
even administration of criminal 
justice.
This point was reiterated by Justice 
Eames in R v Fuller-Cust (2002: [80]) 
who cautioned against ‘a simplistic 
assumption that equal treatment of 
offenders means that differences in 
their individual circumstances related 
to their race should be ignored’. He 
stated that: 
to ignore factors personal to the 
applicant, and his history, in which 
his Aboriginality was a factor, and to 
ignore his perception of the impact 
on his life of his Aboriginality, would 
be to sentence him as someone 
other than himself (2002: [79]).
The ‘material facts’ that have been 
found to be relevant in sentencing 
Indigenous offenders can be grouped 
into three categories:
•  the severe social and economic 
disadvantage, accompanied by 
endemic alcohol abuse, that exists in 
some Indigenous communities
•  the existence of Indigenous laws and 
cultural practices which explain the 
offender’s motivation for committing 
the offence
•  the dispensation of punishment by 
community members pursuant to 
Indigenous laws.
Each of these is discussed further 
below. 
Indigenous disadvantage 
as a mitigating factor
There has been a long history of 
taking the disadvantage experienced 
by Indigenous people into account in 
Australian courts. In Juli v R (1990), 
the Western Australian Court of 
Criminal Appeal cited cases on the 
issue going back to 1957. In Juli the 
court found that while drunkenness is 
not normally an excuse or mitigating 
factor, where the alcohol abuse 
reflects the offender’s socio-economic 
circumstances and environment, it 
may be relevant as a mitigating factor. 
In Rogers & Murray v R (1989), the 
same court referred to the grave 
social problems caused by the use 
of alcohol in Aboriginal communities. 
Justice Malcolm noted that the 
mitigating factor is not ‘the mere fact 
that the offenders concerned were 
aboriginals’ but ‘the social, economic 
and other disadvantages which may 
be associated with ... a particular 
offender’s membership of the 
Aboriginal race’ (1989: 307). 
In Queensland, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in both R v Friday (1984) and 
R v Bulmer (1986) referred to the 
court’s practice of imposing more 
lenient sentences on Aboriginal 
defendants, but noted that concern for 
the victim and deterrence must not be 
neglected. More recently, the courts 
have held that while the personal 
disadvantages experienced by an 
3I n d i g e n o u s  J u s t i c e  C l e a r i n g h o u s e
offender are relevant, the mere fact 
that an Aboriginal offender comes from 
a disadvantaged community does not 
lead to a lower sentence: R v Daniel 
(1998), R v KU (2008).
In R v Fernando (1992), Justice 
Wood of the New South Wales 
Supreme Court set out eight principles 
relevant to sentencing disadvantaged 
Indigenous offenders (1992: 62). He 
drew on precedent from R v Yougie 
(1987: 304) in which the Queensland 
Court of Criminal Appeal stated that ‘it 
would be wrong to fail to acknowledge 
the social difficulties faced by 
Aboriginals’ that have ‘placed heavy 
stresses on them leading to alcohol 
abuse and consequential violence’. 
In Fernando (1992), Justice Wood 
held that the equal treatment of 
Indigenous offenders required, 
where relevant, consideration of their 
subjective circumstances, including 
their Indigenous background where 
it threw ‘light on the particular 
offence and the circumstances of the 
offender’ (1992: 62). He stated that 
where alcohol abuse reflected ‘the 
socio-economic circumstances and 
environment in which the offender 
has grown up’ it should be taken into 
account as a mitigating factor (1992: 
60). He accepted that problems of 
alcohol and violence ‘go hand-in-hand’ 
in Indigenous communities (1992: 
62). Justice Wood pointed to the 
need to consider rehabilitation orders 
because recognition of the relationship 
between alcohol abuse and violence in 
Indigenous communities requires ‘more 
subtle remedies’ than imprisonment 
(1992: 62, 63). These principles 
were later adopted by the New South 
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R 
v Stone (1995: 224).The Fernando 
principles continue to be applied by 
the contemporary New South Wales 
Supreme Court: R v Bashford 2007: 
[45]-[46]; R v F.A.P. 2007: [39]; Waters 
v Regina 2007: [39]. 
A number of New South Wales 
decisions since the late 1990s have 
narrowed the application of the 
Fernando principles. A distinction 
has been made between ‘full’ 
and ‘part’ Indigenous people, and 
between people in remote and urban 
Indigenous communities, to exclude 
the latter categories from the benefit 
of Fernando (R v Ceissman 2001; R 
v Morgan 2003: [22]; R v Newman, 
R v Simpson 2004). Edney (2006a: 
8) argues that these cases attempt 
‘to confine the reach of Fernando 
by fundamentally misapprehending 
the nature of Indigenous identity in 
a post-colonial society’. In R v Smith 
(2003: [53]-[54]), Justice Lander 
pointed to anthropological evidence 
that ‘urban Aboriginal’ people face a 
‘social predicament’ in which there 
are ‘complex rules of kinship which 
determine, govern and influence an 
individual’s fundamental roles in their 
society’.
In R v Pitt (2001) and R v Walter & 
Thompson (2004), the New South 
Wales Supreme Court and Court of 
Criminal Appeal respectively held 
that the requisite disadvantage 
for an Indigenous person must be 
exceptional. For example, where 
offenders had achieved a reasonable 
level of schooling (such as completed 
Year 10), courts do not afford leniency: 
Anderson v R (2008: [24]-[25]); 
Croaker v R (2008: [6]-[7]); R v Knight 
(2004: [14]).
The South Australian courts have 
relied on Fernando in Ingomar v  
Police (1998), Police v Abdulla (1999) 
and R v Tjami (2000).  In Abdulla, the 
South Australian Supreme Court held 
that the Fernando principles should 
receive ‘broad application’ beyond 
‘Aborigines living in the more remote 
communities’ ([34]-[35]), and the Court 
of Criminal Appeal has noted that 
these principles were ‘not restricted 
to traditional aboriginals’ (R v Smith 
2003: [60]).
Some decisions of the Northern 
Territory courts focused on the despair 
arising from cultural breakdown that 
leads to alcohol abuse (R v Benny 
Lee 1974; R v Herbert & Ors 1983; 
Robertson v Flood 1992). Part of the 
judicial rationale was that in these 
circumstances, imprisonment was 
unlikely to be an effective deterrent 
(R v Davey 1980).  However more 
recently, courts have placed greater 
emphasis on the adverse impact 
that a disadvantaged community has 
on victims of crime. This has meant 
that disadvantage is no longer relied 
on as a significant mitigating factor. 
Courts seek to send a deterrent 
message to the community and focus 
on the seriousness of the offence, 
especially in terms of its harm on 
the victim: Amagula v White (1998); 
Wurramara v R (1999). The Northern 
Territory Supreme Court has noted 
that ‘generally speaking, penalties for 
violent crimes have increased since 
Wurramara was decided in 1999’ 
(Massie v R 2006: [24]; R v Bara 
2006: [23]).
In Victoria, the Court of Appeal has 
indicated that ‘the social and economic 
disadvantages often found in 
indigenous communities are powerful 
considerations’: DPP v Terrick (2009: 
[50]). The courts have also taken into 
account disadvantage arising from 
membership of the stolen generations: 
R v Mustey (2001; [13]); Fuller-Cust 
(2002: 520), see further Edney 2003 
and 2006.  However, where the 
offender has prior convictions, the 
weight that can be given to a deprived 
and dysfunctional background is 
reduced: DPP v Terrick (2009: at [61]). 
The ACT Supreme Court recently 
held that the Fernando principles are 
relevant to violent, alcohol-related  
offences committed within Indigenous 
communities, and not to property 
offences committed to fund a heroin 
addiction: Crawford v Laverty (2008).
New Zealand courts, while required 
by statute to take into account the 
offender’s personal, family, whanau, 
community, and cultural background 
(see for example R v Broderson 
2009), have not made specific 
reference to the disadvantage faced 
by Māori  offenders.
The courts must determine 
whether Indigenous sentencing 
considerations apply to the individual 
Indigenous offender, and how 
these considerations will affect the 
penalty. It is not sufficient to show 
that an offender lives in a deprived 
and dysfunctional community: R v 
Daniel (1998), R v KU (2008). Courts 
have acknowledged that Indigenous 
people are not homogenous and 
the individual characteristics of each 
offender must always be considered: 
R v Woodley, Boogna & Charles 
(1994); Russell v R (1995).
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Cultural explanations 
for offending
Indigenous law and culture are 
relevant to a sentence where they 
explain an offender’s motive: R v 
Davey (1980). Where an offender 
believed, based on ‘the old people’s 
ways’ that setting fire to a house was 
the only way to set a dead friend’s 
spirit at peace, the South Australian 
Supreme Court showed leniency:  
Goldsmith v R (1995). Similarly, in 
R v Shannon (1991) the offender’s 
fear of kadaitcha men explained 
some of his offending behaviour and 
the penalty was reduced on appeal.  
The New Zealand High Court took a 
similar approach in R v Rawiri (2009) 
where a Māori offender committed 
manslaughter out of a belief that the 
victim was possessed by spirits. In R 
v Rawiri (2009: [2], [14]-[15]) the court 
viewed the ‘context’ of the defendants’ 
belief that the victim was cursed by 
makutu – an evil spirit that Māori 
people had feared for centuries – as 
relevant to mitigation. The response of 
drowning the victim had been informed 
by Māori culture and concern for the 
victim, rather than ‘warped ideology 
with no regard for others’ (2009: [88]). 
Nonetheless, the court cautioned 
against over-emphasising culture: 
‘whilst the offenders’ culture provided 
a context, it would [be] wrong for the 
offenders to hide behind it’ (2009: 
[100]).
In a number of cases in the Northern 
Territory Court of Criminal Appeal 
involving statutory rape of the 
defendants’ promised (or actual) wife 
in Indigenous law, the courts have 
considered submissions that the 
fact that the defendant was acting in 
accordance with Indigenous law is 
a relevant mitigating circumstance: 
Hales v Jamilmira (2003); R v GJ 
(2005). In these decisions the court 
held that while culture is relevant, 
the principles of deterrence and the 
protection of the victim are paramount. 
These cases have been criticised for 
paying too little attention to the rights 
of the child victims and for ignoring the 
views of Aboriginal women who say 
that their culture does not condone 
violence against women and children 
(McGlade 2006, Howe 2009).
As noted above, the Australian 
Government has legislated to prevent 
the courts from taking into account 
customary law or cultural practice 
as a reason for excusing criminal 
behaviour, or lessening or aggravating 
the seriousness of criminal behaviour 
(Crimes Act 1914 s16A(2A) and 
NTNERA 2007 s91).  The purpose 
of the legislation, as stated in 
the explanatory memorandum 
(Australia.  Parliament 2006) to the 
Crimes Act amendments, was to 
‘ensure that proper sentences are 
given to offenders’ and particularly 
that the law covering crimes of 
family violence and child abuse in 
Indigenous communities ‘reflects their 
seriousness’. Concerns have been 
raised that the legislative restrictions 
would prevent courts from considering 
relevant facts, and thereby produce 
‘yet another way Aboriginal people 
do not stand substantively equal 
before the law’ (Southwood 2007).  
In the case of R v Wunungmurra 
(2009), where the defendant sought 
to introduce evidence about cultural 
law and practice, the NT Supreme 
Court held that the evidence could 
not be introduced for the purpose of 
establishing the objective seriousness 
of the crimes committed by the 
defendant. However no objection was 
raised by the prosecution to hearing 
the evidence for the purposes of 
providing a context and explanation 
for the crimes, to establish that the 
offender did not have a predisposition 
to engage in domestic violence and 
was unlikely to reoffend, to establish 
the offender had good prospects of 
being rehabilitated, and to establish 
the defendant’s character. 
Taking traditional 
punishment into account
For most of the 1980s and 1990s, 
courts regarded the dispensation, 
or prospective dispensation, of 
punishment under Indigenous 
law (referred to as ‘traditional 
punishment’) as a mitigating 
factor. Northern Territory courts 
in particular have discounted 
sentences where the offender has 
undergone or will undergo traditional 
punishment involving shaming, exile, 
compensation and spearing.
Judges discounted sentences on 
the basis of double jeopardy, the 
function of traditional punishment in 
restoring communities and offenders, 
and because traditional punishment 
was a material fact of the defendant’s 
community circumstances: R v 
Mamarika (1982); Jadurin v R 
(1982); R v Minor (1992); Munugurr 
v R (1994); R v Miyatatawuy 
(1996); R v Poulson (2001). Taking 
traditional punishment into account 
also recognises the collective 
responsibility that Indigenous 
communities accept for offences, and 
the need to atone to the Indigenous 
communities (see Fryer-Smith 2002: 
5). Courts have noted that there 
should be evidence that assaults 
are in fact the implementation 
of Indigenous law rather than  
retaliation: R v Mamarika (1982: 
357). Courts have also stressed that 
‘the views, wishes and needs of the 
community … cannot prevail over 
what is a proper sentence’: Munugurr 
v R (1994: 71); R v Minor (1992). 
Courts in some cases went further 
by structuring sentences to facilitate 
traditional punishment (R v Mamarika 
1982; Munugurr v R 1994), or 
directing elders to integrate young 
offenders into Indigenous practices 
(Jabaltjari v Hammersley 1977). 
Courts have made attending a 
meeting between clans a condition of 
a bond: Munugurr (1994 at 77). The 
courts have also asked corrections 
officers to report to the court on 
whether traditional punishment 
occurred: R v Walker (1994). 
In New Zealand, there has not been 
equivalent recognition of Māori 
community punishment. However, 
New Zealand courts have imposed 
non-custodial sentences where the 
offender’s community would invoke 
the offender’s Māori culture and 
enforce ‘a more stable and more 
responsible lifestyle’ (R v Nathan 
1989). In R v Huata & Huata (2005: 
[138]), the Auckland District Court 
noted that the defendant ‘will suffer 
under the Māori  criminal institution of 
whakamaa or shame, and will have 
to carry that for the rest of her life’. 
However, because the defendant 
was supported by others, the effect 
of shame was not a significant 
consideration for sentencing.
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Sentencing statistics
In both Australia and New Zealand, 
Indigenous people are imprisoned 
at much higher rates than non-
Indigenous people.  In New Zealand, 
the rate of Indigenous imprisonment 
is stable with Māori  making up 
approximately 50% of all those 
sentenced to imprisonment in both 
2000 (Spier 2001) and 2006 (Morrison 
et al 2008), yet only 14.6% of the 
population is Māori. In Australia the 
Indigenous adult imprisonment rate 
is thirteen times higher  than the non-
Indigenous imprisonment rate. The 
Indigenous imprisonment rate rose 
37% between 2001 and 2008 while 
the non-Indigenous imprisonment rate 
rose by only 8% (Fitzgerald 2009). 
There is considerable discussion as 
to whether these imprisonment rates 
are due to different offending rates 
or direct and indirect discrimination 
within the criminal justice system, or 
a combination of the two (see further 
Morrison 2009, Blagg et al 2005). 
This research brief will not explore 
this debate, but will review the studies 
which attempt to determine whether 
bias in sentencing contributes to high 
imprisonment rates. 
In New Zealand, studies that control 
for the seriousness of the offence 
and prior offending have produced 
mixed results. Lovell and Norris (1990) 
studied male offenders aged 10-24 
and found that Māori offenders were 
more likely than non-Māori offenders 
to receive a custodial sentence, after 
controlling for the nature of the offence 
and the age and prior offending of the 
defendant. However Deane’s study 
of 362 people sentenced in 1989 in 
one District Court found no evidence 
of discrimination between Māori and 
non- Māori (Deane 1995).  A study of 
300 000 cases involving imprisonable 
offences in 1983, 1987, 1991 and 
1995 found that, after controlling for 
relevant legal variables, the use of 
imprisonment did not differ between 
ethnic groups, but Māori were more 
likely to be sentenced to periodic 
detention and community programs, 
and less likely to be fined (Triggs 
2009). 
A number of Australian studies have 
compared Indigenous and non-
Indigenous sentencing outcomes. 
Taking into account the seriousness 
of the offence and the offender’s 
criminal history, Luke and Cunneen 
(1998: 80) found that in the Northern 
Territory imprisonment was used as 
a sentencing option twice as much 
for Indigenous offenders as for non-
Indigenous offenders. Indigenous 
offenders were also sentenced 
to prison at an earlier stage of 
their offending history (1998: 58). 
A subsequent study by Snowball 
and Weatherburn (2007: 286) on 
sentencing Indigenous offenders in 
New South Wales, found that there 
was ‘some residual effect of race on 
sentencing’, which meant that ‘racial 
bias may influence the sentencing 
process even if its effects are only 
small’. Jeffries and Bond’s study of 
sentencing in South Australia from 
2005 to 2006 reveals that, after 
controlling for offender, case and court 
processing characteristics, Indigenous 
people were much less likely to 
receive prison sentences. However 
those who were sentenced to prison 
were likely to receive longer sentences 
than non-Indigenous people (2009). 
The same authors examined the 
sentencing of Indigenous and non-
Indigenous women in Western 
Australia and found that, after 
controlling for offending behaviour and 
history, Indigenous women were less 
likely than non-Indigenous women to 
be sentenced to imprisonment (Bond 
& Jeffries 2009).  All of these studies 
used different methods, examined 
different time periods and different 
jurisdictions, and further research 
would be required to reconcile their 
results.
The NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics 
and Research 2009 report on New 
South Wales Indigenous offenders 
revealed that between 2001 and 
2008 its Indigenous prison population 
increased by 56.4% (Fitzgerald 2009: 
4). The author attributed the growth 
to an increase in the proportion of 
Indigenous offenders given a prison 
sentence and the length of the 
prison terms imposed, rather than 
an increase in the conviction rates 
(Fitzgerald 2009: 5). Therefore, the 
results suggested ‘that the substantial 
increase in the number of Indigenous 
people in prison is due mainly to 
changes in the criminal justice 
system’s response to offending’, with 
a ‘greater impact on the Indigenous 
prison population than on the non-
Indigenous prison population’. 
Furthermore, sentence lengths have 
increased for the same types of 
offences. 
Significant differences also emerge 
with juvenile offenders. A study by 
the Judicial Commission of New 
South Wales of juveniles before local 
courts found that Indigenous juveniles 
were no more likely to be subject to 
a control order (detention) but were 
more likely to receive community 
service orders and supervised orders 
than their Anglo-Australian matched 
counterparts, and less likely to be 
fined (Gallagher & Poletti 1998). An 
Australian Institute of Criminology 
report found that in Western Australian 
Children’s Courts, 25% of Indigenous 
male offenders and 13% of Indigenous 
female offenders were sentenced to 
custody, compared with 9% and 4% 
for their non-Indigenous counterparts 
(Richards 2009: 93). However, 
there remains a need for longer-
term studies across all jurisdictions, 
particularly Western Australia, which 
has the highest rate of Indigenous 
incarceration (ABS 2008), and in 
the Northern Territory, which has the 
fastest rate of growth in Indigenous 
incarceration.
In 1991, the RCIADIC noted that the 
availability of sentencing statistics 
which distinguished between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
offenders was “quite unsatisfactory”, 
particularly in relation to people 
sentenced to non-custodial options. 
It remains the case that information 
about offenders sentenced to non-
custodial options is not available.
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Conclusion 
This brief has summarised the 
main issues arising in relation to 
sentencing Indigenous offenders in 
Australia and New Zealand.  For a 
more detailed analysis of the complex 
matters relating to the relationship 
between the general Australian law 
and Indigenous law, the reports of 
the Australian, New South Wales 
and Western Australian law reform 
commissions are recommended. For 
discussion of the innovations taking 
place in Indigenous sentencing courts, 
see Marchetti’s 2009 research brief for 
the Clearinghouse. 
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